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This paper shows that vertical foreign direct investment will reduce prices
but the aggregate welfare eﬁect is unambiguously positive only under free
market entry. Using a standard model of imperfect competition, we develop
this result by considering two diﬁerent cases. In the ﬂrst case, the total
number of ﬂrms is ﬂxed, and we show that national and multinational ﬂrms
may coexist. In the second case, we allow for market entry, and we focus
on situations in which either only national or only multinational ﬂrms are
active. Furthermore, we discuss impact eﬁects on labor demand. We show
that a decline in foreign wages increases domestic employment.
JEL-Classiﬂcation: F12, F15.
Keywords: Vertical foreign direct investment, multinational enterprises,
imperfect competition, welfare, labor demand.1 Introduction
The era of globalization can be characterized by an ongoing integration of
factor and commodity markets. One key observation is that aggregate world
trade grows faster than world GDP. But integration does not only take place
by commodity trade. Another important observation is that foreign direct
investment (FDI) adds more to globalization than trade does. Figure 1 shows
that the sales of foreign a–liates have outnumbered world exports for two
decades. These sales are based on FDI, and their magnitude emphasizes how
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Figure 1: World exports and sales of foreign a–liates in billions of US Dollars
(Source: United Nations, World Investment Report, various editions).
These empirical ﬂgures have found their counterpart in the international
economics literature. Among other things, this literature studies the role of
multinational ﬂrms which are supposed to set up production plants in foreign
countries, that is to do FDI. This literature has now reached a certain de-
gree of maturity. It distinguishes between horizontal FDI (Markusen, 1984;
1Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; Brainard, 1993; Markusen and Venables
1998, 2000; De Santis and St˜ ahler, 2000) and vertical FDI (Helpman, 1984;
Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Horizontal FDI is dominant among industri-
alized countries which do not diﬁer substantially in production possibilities
and per capita endowment with factors of production. In this case, ﬂrms set
up an additional production plant in another country, and this plant then
serves this country’s market which was served by exports before. The inten-
tion is to be closer to the market and to avoid trade costs which are associated
with exports. Hence, horizontal FDI replaces trade, and the domestic market
will still be served by a production plant in the domestic country. The trade-
oﬁ a potential multinational ﬂrm has to consider is that FDI saves variable
costs but implies additional ﬂxed costs to set up a production plant in the
other country.
Although empirical evidence suggests that horizontal FDI dominates
(Brainard, 1997, Blonigen, 2001, Markusen and Maskus, 2000), vertical FDI
becomes more important.1 Vertical FDI takes place between countries which
diﬁer substantially in factor endowment and production possibilities. Usu-
ally, one country is able to host the headquarters of an oligopolistic industry
producing a high skilled labor intensive commodity. Vertical FDI may occur
if the production process can be split into a part which requires high skilled
labor and a part which requires low skilled labor. In this case, it may be
proﬂtable to move the production process requiring low skilled labor to the
other country if labor costs in this country are su–ciently low. FDI is, then,
complementary to trade. Typically, vertical FDI is important in industries
which require substantial ﬂxed investments in terms of skilled labor. These
investments can be, for instance, in research and development or in the de-
velopment of special product designs. Therefore, in many cases vertical FDI
takes place in industries with substantial economies of scale, implying neces-
1For example, the Economist expects that global FDI will shrink in the next ﬂve years
whereas FDI to poor countries is expected to remain by and large constant. See "The
cutting edge", The Economist of February 24th 2001, Vol. 358, No. 8210, p. 90.
2sarily imperfect competition on product markets. Furthermore, according to
the eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1977), multinational ﬂrms will themselves
invest abroad if ownership and internalization advantages are dominant and
hence they are not interested in selling licenses to foreign ﬂrms. Otherwise,
ﬂrms could simply alter their boundaries and buy instead of make certain
inputs.
In the theoretical literature the main focus of FDI models under imperfect
competition has been on horizontal FDI. However, the relevance of vertical
FDI has also become very clear after the NAFTA has been launched and
after the former communist countries in Eastern Europe were able to attract
FDI. In both cases, substantial diﬁerences in variable costs, in particular in
labor costs, could be observed, leading to vertical FDI within industries. A
basic diﬁerence between both cases is the diﬁerent impact on labor markets.
NAFTA aﬁected labor markets which are by and large competitive in North
America so that vertical FDI altered the wage structure within economies.
On the contrary, due to dominant collective wage bargaining, wages in West-
ern Europe are not that ￿exible so that vertical FDI in Europe triggered
structural employment eﬁects.
In this paper, we will develop a model which takes into account all the men-
tioned features of vertical FDI. First, we acknowledge that ﬂrms deciding
on vertical FDI typically face substantial ﬂxed costs. This feature opens the
avenue to imperfect competition and strategic interactions among ﬂrms. We
will show that consumers will always beneﬂt from vertical FDI. However,
vertical FDI may reduce proﬂts and even aggregate welfare if market entry is
not possible. It improves aggregate welfare unambiguously under free market
entry despite a possible increase in industry concentration. Second, we will
argue that the reduction in variable costs achieved by vertical FDI implies
additional ﬂxed costs. In order to have a plant run in the foreign country,
more coordination and supervision is necessary than in the home country.
These ﬂxed costs will decide on the proﬂtability of vertical FDI. Third, we
3will consider labor market impacts in some depth. We will not model the
labor market explicitly but we will simply demonstrate how vertical FDI will
change labor demand in the home country for given factor prices, re￿ect-
ing the discussion in Europe, where the labor market is to a large extent
characterized by wage bargaining between unions and employers, and unem-
ployment seems to be persistent. Hence, it is clear that the eﬁects of vertical
FDI on employment have been at the heart of the debate in Europe. We
will demonstrate that the labor market eﬁects are not as clear as expected
at ﬂrst glance. In particular, we will show that vertical FDI alters aggregate
production and hence also the demand for high-skilled labor.
There is one clear predecessor to this paper. In a recent article, Zhang and
Markusen (1999) discuss which countries are able to attract vertical FDI.
Their analysis is based on a two country general equilibrium model. The head-
quarters of ﬂrms in an oligopolistic industry can exist only in the developed
country but the developing country may host production plants employing
low-skilled labor. The industry performance is determined by Cournot behav-
ior of ﬂrms and free entry, leading to zero proﬂts in equilibrium, and perfect
competition on all other factor and commodity markets. Due to the complex-
ity of the model, the model is solved by numerical simulations. Because size
matters under imperfect competition, Zhang and Markusen conclude that
small, skilled labor scarce countries are hardly able to attract FDI, leading
to a development trap.
Our paper departures from this approach in several respects. First, we do
not consider general equilibrium eﬁects but we are interested in the change
in industry performance. Hence, our model will be less complex but can be
solved analytically. Second, we consider also the case that market entry is
not possible, at least in the short run. Third, we conduct an explicit welfare
analysis for all cases. Fourth, we do not assume ￿exible wages in order to
determine changes in labor demand. The eﬁects of FDI will be determined
by comparing the FDI regime under which FDI is possible and proﬂtable
4with a trade regime under which FDI is not possible or banned. Accordingly,
the structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will introduce the model
and will investigate the impact of vertical FDI on consumers’ surplus, proﬂts
and aggregate welfare if the number of active ﬂrms is ﬂxed. This scenario may
well re￿ect the case of an industry to which market entry is not possible in
the short run due to technological or institutional barriers to entry. Section 3
will do the same job for endogenous market structures, that is, if market
entry is possible, at least in the long run. Section 4 will determine the labor
market eﬁects for both cases. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Industry structure and welfare without en-
try
This section assumes that the number of active ﬂrms is ﬂxed but that a ﬂrm
may choose to be either a national or multinational ﬂrm if FDI is allowed
(FDI regime). National ﬂrms serve the market by a plant next to their head-
quarters; multinational ﬂrms serve the market by a plant set up in the foreign
country. We will then compare this case with the case that FDI is banned
(trade regime), and hence only national ﬂrms exist. Since setting up a plant
in the foreign country is observable by rivals, we assume the following game
structure: in the ﬂrst stage, ﬂrms decide whether to set up a production
plant in the foreign country (and thereby closing down production in the
home country) or to continue to produce in the home country. Since setting
up a plant in another country is likely to be more costly than doing so next
to the headquarters, some additional ﬂxed costs have to be covered in case
of vertical FDI. In the second stage, all ﬂrms compete in the usual Cournot
fashion. As usual, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is determined by back-
ward induction. Table 1 shows this game structure, and the benchmarking
case is given if ﬂrms are not allowed to be of the multinational type in stage 1.
The speciﬂc model we employ is similar to models used in the so-called new
5Table 1: Game structure without market entry
Stage 1 Firms decide on their type
Stage 2 Firms determine production
trade literature. We assume a linear demand function
Y = s(a ¡ p); (1)
with a;s > 0w h e r es denotes the size of the market. Eq. (1) gives the
behavior of an integrated world market, and this function can be derived
from utility maximization of identical consumers with quasi linear utility
functions. Concerning the industry structure, we distinguish two types of
ﬂrms. h will denote the number of national ﬂrms producing at home with
constant marginal costs ch where a>c h. n is the number of all active ﬂrms
in the industry, so that m = n ¡ h is the number of multinational ﬂrms.
Vertical FDI implies additional ﬂxed costs of size f and marginal costs of
cm.O b v i o u s l y ,ch >c m should hold for potential proﬂtability of vertical FDI.
In this setting, it makes no diﬁerence whether the skill-intensively produced
good is an intermediate (as in Zhang, Markusen, 1999) or the ﬂnal good using
an intermediate which is produced with low-skilled labor since ch and cm give
the total marginal costs for both production stages. We will be more explicit
on the labor requirements in diﬁerent stages of production in Section 4.
Let yh(ym) denote the equilibrium output of a national (multinational) ﬂrm.
The f.o.c.’s yield
yh = s
a ¡ ch ¡ m(ch ¡ cm)
n +1
;y m = s
a ¡ cm +( n ¡ m)(ch ¡ cm)
n +1
; (2)
and equilibrium proﬂts of
ƒh = s
(a ¡ ch ¡ m(ch ¡ cm))2
(n +1 ) 2 ; ƒm = s
(a ¡ cm +( n ¡ m)(ch ¡ cm))2
(n +1 ) 2 ¡ f;
(3)
6where f denotes the additional ﬂxed costs to move the revelant part of the
production from the home to the foreign country. We assume that a ¡ cm >
maxfn(ch¡cm);
p
f(n+1)g which ensures that all ﬂrms make positive proﬂts,
irrespective of h.2
Diﬁerentiating (3) demonstrates the following lemma:







Lemma 1 states that a ﬂrm, if it moves its production to the foreign coun-
try, creates a negative externality for all other ﬂrms. The externality arises,
because outputs are strategic substitutes and the reduction in the ﬂrm’s vari-
able costs due to the move of the production to the foreign country increases
production of this ﬂrm.
Firms may decide to produce either at home or abroad. If the number of
multinational ﬂrms is m, a multinational ﬂrm does not have an incentive to
move production to the home country if V (m): =ƒ m(m) ¡ ƒh(m ¡ 1) > 0.
If V (m) • 0, a multinational ﬂrm wants to move production to the home
country. If V (m+1) = ƒm(m+1)¡ƒh(m) > 0a n dm multinational ﬂrms are
active, a national ﬂrm can improve its proﬂts by moving production abroad.
In equilibrium, changing the location of production should be unproﬂtable
for either type of ﬂrm. Thus, a number of multinational ﬂrms m⁄ constitutes
an equilibrium if the following no-switching conditions hold:3
V (m
⁄) ‚ 0 >V(m
⁄ +1 ) ( 5 )
Ignoring the integer constraint on the numbers of ﬂrms, these conditions
imply that the equilibrium number of national ﬂrms satisﬂes exactly the
2a¡cm >n (ch¡cm) guarantees that the output of a national ﬂrm is positive, a¡cm > p
f(n + 1) guarantees that the market is proﬂtable if only multinational ﬂrms are active.
3A similar equilibrium concept is employed in Mills and Smith (1998) and Elberfeld
(2001) to study technology choice.
7no-switching condition:
V (m
⁄)=0 ( 6 )
The function V (m) describes the individual incentive for a national ﬂrm to
undertake vertical FDI:
V (m)=s[
2n(a ¡ ch)(ch ¡ cm)+n(n +2 ) ( ch ¡ cm)2
(n +1 ) 2 ¡
2n(ch ¡ cm)2m
(n +1 ) 2 ] ¡ f:
(7)
Eq. (7) says that the individual incentive to invest in FDI is decreasing in the
number of multinational ﬂrms. This means that (6) has at most one solution.






(n +1 ) 2f=s¡ 2n(a ¡ ch)(ch ¡ cm)
2n(ch ¡ cm)2 : (8)
This is only true if an interior solution exists, that is, if 0 <m ⁄ <n . Vertical
FDI will not occur if the rhs in (8) is smaller or equal than zero, i.e. if
f ‚
ns(ch ¡ cm)(2(a ¡ ch)+n(ch ¡ cm))
(n +1 ) 2 =: f(a;ch;c m;s;n)( 9 )
If the ﬂxed cost disadvantage of a multinational ﬂrm is su–ciently large,
national ﬂrms will be dominant and no multinational ﬂrm can realize the
same proﬂts. In this case, the equilibrium number of multinational ﬂrms is
m⁄ = 0. On the contrary, if the rhs in (8) is larger or equal than n, i.e. if
f •
ns(ch ¡ cm)(2(a ¡ ch) ¡ n(ch ¡ cm))
(n +1 ) 2 =: f(a;ch;c m;s;n); (10)
multinational ﬂrms will be dominant and the equilibrium number of multi-
national ﬂrms is m⁄ = n.
4If the integer constraints on the numbers of ﬂrms are taken into account, the equilib-
rium number of multinational ﬂrms is the largest integer number equal or smaller than
m⁄. For simplicity, we will ignore the integer constraint and will use m⁄.
8Since
f ¡ f =
2n2s(ch ¡ cm)2
(n +1 ) 2 > 0; (11)
a range of ﬂxed costs exists which supports coexistence. Eq. (11) proves the
following lemma:
Lemma 2 If market entry and exit are not possible, multinational and na-
tional ﬂrms may coexist.
The intuition for Lemma 2 can be demonstrated as follow. Take, for instance,
f = f, and reduce f, so that multinational production will become prof-
itable. An increase in the number of multinationals will decrease the proﬂts
of multinational ﬂrms more than the proﬂts of national ﬂrms (see Lemma 1).
Therefore, a small change in f induces only a small increase in the number
of multinational ﬂrms so that we obtain coexistence of both ﬂrm types for a
sizeable range of parameters.
Apart from the negative eﬁect of an increase in f on the number of multina-
tional ﬂrms, (8) implies that m⁄ decreases with cm and increases with ch, a
and s. The eﬁects of increases in the various cost parameters are intuitive. If
market size increases (measured by an increase in a or s), the output of each
ﬂrm increases. As a result, vertical FDI becomes more attractive because
multinational ﬂrms are better able to realize economies of scale. An increase
in n by k ﬂrms increases the number of multinational ﬂrms by less than k=2












An increase in the number of ﬂrms decreases proﬂts of multinational ﬂrms
faster than those of national ﬂrms. To restore the equilibrium conditions, the
number of national ﬂrms must increase relative to the number of multina-
tional ones.
9We now turn to the welfare analysis. Since we assume quasi-linear prefer-
ences, welfare and welfare changes can be measured by the sum of industry
proﬂts and consumers’ surplus. If FDI is proﬂtable and both types of ﬂrms
coexist, proﬂts of both national and multinational ﬂrms increase with increas-
ing costs of FDI, i.e. with increasing f. This result is obvious for national
ﬂrms. They proﬂt from the fall in m⁄ which is implied by an increase in f (see
equation (8)). The same holds for multinational ﬂrms. If one takes @m⁄=@f




a ¡ cm +( n ¡ m)(ch ¡ cm)
n(ch ¡ cm)
¡ 1 > 0: (13)
The ﬂrst term on the rhs must be larger than 1 in order to ensure that small
ﬂrms are proﬂtable. Aggregate consumption is
Y =( n ¡ m)yh + mym = s
n(a ¡ cm) ¡ (n ¡ m)(ch ¡ cm)
n +1
: (14)






(n(a ¡ cm) ¡ (n ¡ m)(ch ¡ cm))2
2(n +1 ) 2 : (15)
Obviously, consumers are always better oﬁ by vertical FDI since lower
marginal costs of some suppliers for a ﬂxed number of ﬂrms in the whole
industry will reduce equilibrium prices. To obtain the eﬁect on total welfare,
we need to aggregate the two opposing eﬁects which leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Compared to a trade regime, the aggregate welfare eﬁect of
vertical FDI is ambiguous if market entry and exit are not possible.
Proof: Deﬂne welfare as a function of m:
W(m)=CS(m)+mƒm(m)+( n ¡ m)ƒh(m): (16)
10Substituting m⁄ into W(m)a n ds o l v i n gW(m)¡W(0) > 0f o rf yields that
welfare eﬁect of vertical FDI is positive if
(ch ¡ cm)s(2(a ¡ ch)+( ch ¡ cm)(2n2 +5 n +4 ) )
(n +1 ) 2(2n ¡ 3)
>f ; (17)
and negative otherwise. ⁄
To obtain further insights into the welfare properties, we evaluate the case
that FDI is quite costly and we calibrate f such that the equilibrium number
of multinational ﬂrms is 1:
f(m
⁄ =1 )=
(ch ¡ cm)(2a + ch(n ¡ 4) ¡ cm(n ¡ 2))ns
(n +1 ) 2 : (18)
The welfare eﬁect of FDI for f = f(m⁄ =1 )i s :
W(m
⁄ =1 )¡ W(0) = ¡s(ch ¡ cm)A; (19)
where A := 2(n ¡ 2)(a ¡ 4ch +3 cm) ¡ 11(ch ¡ cm).
A su–cient condition for (19) to be negative is that n ‚ 8a n dt h a td o m e s t i c
ﬂrms are viable if four multinational ﬂrms were active. To see this, insert
n =8i n t oA and note that the sign of A is certainly positive if we replace
11 by 12 and obtain a positive sign for the resulting expression ~ A. ~ A can
be written as 12(a ¡ 5ch +4 cm). Note that the term in brackets determines
whether the output of domestic ﬂrms is positive if four multinational ﬂrms
were active (see (2)). Therefore, A is positive and W(1) ¡ W(0) is negative
if domestic ﬂrms were viable if four multinational ﬂrms were active. We
conclude from this excercise that FDI is likely to decrease welfare if the
equilibrium number of multinational ﬂrms is small unless the total number
of ﬂrms is small and the marginal cost advantage of the multinational ﬂrms
is very large.
Turning to the case, when FDI is more productive, i.e. f is small and m⁄
is large, note that FDI may be welfare increasing.5The reason is that the
5FDI is, for instance, welfare increasing if the parameter values are ch =2 ;c m =0 ;a=
100;s=1 ;n=4 8a n df is such that m =4 7 .
11function W(m⁄)i sc o n v e xi nf because the respective second derivative reads
(n +1 ) 2(2n ¡ 3)=(4(ch ¡ cm)2n2s). The resulting pattern can most easily be
illustrated by means of an example.
4 6 f     
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Figure 2: Welfare as a function of the FDI speciﬂc ﬂxed costs f.
Figure 2 shows that aggregate welfare is non-monotonic in the ﬂxed costs.6
Aggregate welfare declines with the emergence of multinational ﬂrms and
increases the more multinationals are active. The graph shows the behavior
of aggregate welfare for levels of ﬂxed costs which imply coexistence. As long
as a switch leads to a mixed industry structure, welfare is lower than in the
trade regime.
The reason for the negative welfare result is a rent dissipation eﬁect. Firms
undertake investments to capture a larger share of proﬂts. If FDI should be
welfare increasing, a rationalizing eﬁect, realizing economies of scale, would
be necessary. This is, however, prevented by the fact that exit does not occur.
In the next section, we will show that this rationalizing eﬁect implies welfare
gains if entry and exit are possible.
6Figure 2 gives the results of a simulation using parameter values ch =2 ;c m =0 ;a=
100;s=1a n dn =4 0 .
123 Industry structure and welfare under free
entry
In the last section we considered an industry in which market entry and exit
were not allowed. If institutional barriers to entry do not exist, however, also
technological barriers to entry may be overcome by potential entrants if the
industry yields more than normal proﬂts. On the contrary, if the industry
suﬁers from losses, some ﬂrms will leave the market. In this section, we will
take these long-run adjustment in the industry structure into account. Con-
sequently, we assume the following three stage game: ﬂrms decide on market
entry in the ﬂrst stage, and those which have entered decide on their type
in the second stage. Finally, all active ﬂrms compete in the usual Cournot
fashion. We will then compare this case with the trade regime under which
ﬂrms are not allowed to be of the multinational type in stage 2.
We will show that the possible adjustment to the proﬂtability of the industry
will imply substantially diﬁerent results. In order to determine the equilib-
rium industry structure, we will assume that each ﬂrm, whether national or
multinational, has to cover ﬂxed costs of size g. These ﬂxed costs are neces-
sary to run the headquarters and the production plant in the home country,
and ﬂrms decide on this investment in stage 1. As before, a multinational
ﬂrm has to carry additional ﬂxed costs f, and all ﬂrms which have entered
in stage 1 decide on this investment in stage 2. Hence, f is the diﬁerence in
ﬂxed cost of running a plant in the foreign country compared to running it in
the home country. Since skilled labor is abundant in the home country but
scarce in the foreign country, the headquarters will stay in the home country
anyway. Table 2 summarizes the game structure employed in this section.
The main question in this section concerns the possible industry structure. It
can be derived from G˜ otz (2002), who employs a similar framework. To derive
industry structure ﬂrst deﬂne Th = ch+
p
g=s and Tm = cm+
p
(g + f)=s. Th
and Tm are the average costs realized by a national ﬂrm and a multinational
13Table 2: Game structure with entry and exit
Stage 1 Firms decide on market entry
Stage 2 Firms decide on their type
Stage 3 Firms determine production
ﬂrm, respectively, in a free entry equilibrium in which only the respective
type of ﬂrms is active. Furthermore, deﬂne D · (a=Tm) ¡ (a=Th).
Proposition 2 If D ‚ 2, a unique equilibrium exists and in equilibrium
all ﬂrms are multinational. If Th <T m, a unique equilibrium exists and in
equilibrium all ﬂrms are national.
Proof: The proof is identical to that of Proposition 1 in G˜ otz (2002) and
therefore omitted. ⁄
The conditions employed in Proposition 2 guarantee that the no-switching
condition mentioned above (see equation (5)) is satisﬂed in a situation in
which the number of ﬂrms is active, which would emerge in a free entry
equilibrium with only one type of ﬂrms. For general h and m,t h e s en u m b e r s
are calculated from
ƒh(h;m)=s
(a ¡ ch ¡ m(ch ¡ cm))2
(h + m +1 ) 2 ¡ g =0 ; (20)
ƒm(h;m)=s
(a ¡ cm + h(ch ¡ cm))2
(h + m +1 ) 2 ¡ g ¡ f =0 :
Setting either h or m equal to 0, yields the zero proﬂt numbers. If Proposition
2 applies, a single ﬂrm does not have an incentive to deviate from a ’candi-
date’ equilibrium with only one type of ﬂrms. The respective technology is
su–ciently superior in terms of a cost advantage. G˜ otz (2002) shows that for
D<2a n dTh >T m quite diﬁerent outcomes are possible. The results range
from non-existence of equilibrium to equilibria with co-existence of diﬁerent
types as well as the occurrence of multiple equilibria. From the point of view
14of our paper, the most important result, however, is that for large markets
one almost always obtains equilibria in which only one type of ﬂrms is ac-
tive.7 Starting from an integrated world market, it seems to be justiﬂed to
speak of a large market in this case. Therefore, we neglect the cases which
arise if Proposition 2 does not apply for the remainder of the paper. We focus
on equilibria in which either national ﬂrms or multinational ﬂrms are active.
If only national ﬂrms are active, the equilibrium market structure is given by
h
⁄ =
a ¡ ch p
g=s
¡ 1;m
⁄ =0 : (21)
Note that the market will be proﬂtable for a national ﬂrm only if
p
g=s <
a ¡ ch , g<s (a ¡ ch)2. Otherwise, no national ﬂrm will be able to recoup
its ﬂxed costs.
Since proﬂts are zero in equilibrium, we may measure welfare by the equilib-
rium price. For the case that only national ﬂrms are active, we ﬂnd that the
equilibrium price (denoted by the superscript h)i s
p









a ¡ cm p
(f + g)=s
¡ 1; (23)
and the equilibrium price (denoted by the superscript m)i s
p
m = a ¡ m
⁄ym=s =
p
(f + g)=s + cm: (24)
Two eﬁects are of further interest. First, it is interesting how the number of
active ﬂrms changes when FDI is possible and becomes proﬂtable. Due to
Proposition 2, this question boils down to comparing (23) with (21), given
7This result derives immediately from the conditions underlying Proposition 2. For
both large s and large a they are likely to be satisﬂed.
15that FDI is proﬂtable. Second, a possible increase or decrease in industry
concentration and lower variable cost will aﬁect equilibrium prices and hence
welfare. The following proposition answers both questions.
Proposition 3 The impact of vertical FDI on industry concentration is am-
biguous. Despite this ambiguity, vertical foreign direct investment will reduce
prices and increase welfare compared to a trade regime.
Proof: The decline in price (which is equivalent to an increase in welfare due
to the zero proﬂt conditions (20)) will be proved by contradiction. Welfare
will decline by vertical FDI if pm >p h which requires that
ch ¡ cm <
p
(f + g)=s ¡
p
g=s , f>f




f0 denotes the critical size of ﬂxed costs which would lead to equal prices with
and without FDI. If we derive from the condition Th = Tm the restriction
of f such that all ﬂrms are domestic ﬂrms is no longer an equilibrium, we
obtain
f<f
0 = s(ch ¡ cm)(ch ¡ cm +2
p
g=s): (26)
This condition shows that welfare decreasing vertical FDI is never possible
since (25) and (26) are contradictory.
It is clear from (23) that m⁄ will be the larger the smaller is f.H e n c e ,i ff
is su–ciently small, m⁄ will be larger than h⁄ according to (21) because of
cm <c h. Eq. (26) has shown that f0 determines the size of ﬂxed costs for
which multinational production is as proﬂtable as national production. For













s (ch ¡ cm)
(27)
As h⁄ can be written as
h
⁄ =






16we obtain m⁄ <h ⁄ for f = f0 which shows that there is a range of ﬂxed costs
f where the switch to the FDI scenario leads to an increase in concentration.
⁄
The ambiguous eﬁect on concentration is due to negative relation between
f and the number of multinational ﬂrms. As f falls m⁄ increases. Although
multinational ﬂrms have to bear higher ﬂxed costs than domestic ﬂrms, their
equilibrium number may be larger. This is due to the lower marginal costs
of the multinational ﬂrms leading to higher demand. The eﬁect on welfare
is clear-cut. Due to entry, there are no excess proﬂts. Thus, proﬂt stealing
cannot occur. As prices fall when ﬂrms go for FDI, welfare must increase.
4 Impact eﬁects of vertical foreign direct in-
vestment on labor demand
So far we have investigated the eﬁects of vertical FDI as it is common in a
partial equilibrium welfare analysis. However, vertical FDI is also expected
to aﬁect employment patterns substantially, and this is possibly the main
issue which troubles politicians in the home countries of vertical FDI. In this
section we will address this issue, but we will still use the partial equilibrium
model, and we will assume that changes in the industry do not cause changes
in factor prices. Thus, we analyse how labor demand changes in a particular
industry due to FDI, and we do not consider any eﬁects on other sectors of
the economy. However, any impact eﬁect on labor demand translates into an
eﬁect on the level of economy wide employment if one adopts the "European"
approach like Krugman (1995) and assumes rigid factor prices.8 Even if factor
prices adjust in the long run, the labor demand eﬁects of our model seem to
be important for employment at least for a transition period, when wages are
8To be exact, our impact eﬁect equals the employment eﬁect if labor is immobile across
sectors in addition to rigid factor prices. Maurice Obstfeld seems to consider both of these
features to be characteristic for Europe (see the general discussion following Krugman
(1995)).
17sticky. For continental Europe, this assumption seems to be more appropriate
than the assumption perfect competition on factor markets as in Zhang and
Markusen (1999).9
In order to evaluate the factor market eﬁects of FDI, we specify the cost func-
tions explicitly. Focusing on the labor market eﬁects, the inputs we consider
are the demand for skilled and unskilled labor. wS and wU denote wages of
skilled and unskilled workers at home, respectively. The wage a multinational
pays for unskilled labor in the foreign county is wM. For simplicity, we as-
sume that there are no skilled workers in the foreign country so that skilled
labor services in multinational production are provided by mobile domestic
skilled workers. Greek letters will denote input requirements.
T h eﬂ x e dc o s t so fs e t t i n gu pp r o d u c t i o na th o m ec o m p r i s e
g = w
S" + w
U(· + ‰): (29)
Both skilled and unskilled labor enter g. " and · are the input requirements
for headquarters services. The ﬂxed cost associated with a domestic pro-





U‰; ‰M ‚ ‰: (30)
With a foreign production plant, setup costs for foreign production replace
setup costs for domestic production. We allow economies of scope (‰M ‚ ‰)
in the sense that locating production next to the headquarters at the same
location reduces factor demand. f includes also additional overhead costs
wS` for supervision, monitoring and training of the foreign work force. We
assume that these tasks require skilled labor. ` may also be aﬁected by the
costs of setting up business in the host country. Of particular importance are
legal requirements for doing business.
9Similarly to our paper, Skaksen and S¿rensen (2001) derive employment eﬁects from
a partial equilibrium model.
18With respect to marginal costs, we assume that FDI transfers the technology
completely so that the labor input requirements ￿ and – are identical in both








Additionally, we assume that production requires less skilled labor than un-
skilled labor, that is, – ‚ ￿ because the part of production which is poten-
tially outsourced should be intensive in unskilled labor. The cost advantage of
multinational production is due to lower factor prices in the foreign country,
i. e. wM <w U. This speciﬂcation mirrors a two-stage production process. In
stage 1, an intermediate product is manufactured. In stage 2, assembly of the
intermediate products yields the ﬂnal output. In this setup, FDI is equivalent
to the outsourcing of the stage requiring only unskilled labor. Depending on
the production process, this may be either stage 1 or stage 2. Our speciﬂ-
cation assumes ﬂxed proportions among the inputs in both stages. Recent
empirical research shows that the extent of substitution among the inputs in
the home and the foreign country is limited.11 Thus, our assumption of ﬂxed
proportions seems to ﬂt well and may well re￿ect the employment eﬁects
of the drastic changes which result from outsourcing a complete production
stage via FDI.12
10Empirically, it seems to be the transfer of technology and the potential technological
spillovers associated with FDI, which makes FDI so attractive for developing countries
(see, e.g., Findlay, 1978).
11For instance, Brainard and Riker (1997) show that ’labor employed at diﬁerent levels
of development (...) are complementary’ (p.2).
12Marginal changes are considered by Brainard and Riker (1997) who analyse the em-
ployment eﬁects of wage changes for the case of ﬂrms who already moved part of their
value chain abroad. With respect to these marginal changes, they ﬂnd that changes in wage
in FDI host country hardly aﬁects employment in the home country of the multinationals.
19Labor demand of national and multinational ﬂrms can be derived using Shep-
hard’s lemma. Demand for (domestic) skilled workers reads
L
S = m(` + " + ￿ym)+h(" + ￿yh): (33)
Using aggregate output Y as deﬂned in (14), LS can be written as
L
S = n" + ￿Y + m`: (34)
The demand for domestic unskilled worker amounts to
L
U = n· + h(‰ + –yh); (35)
and demand for (unskilled) labor in the foreign country is
L
F = m(‰M + –ym): (36)
LF is mentioned here for completeness only. It is clear that demand for for-
eign workers always increases if the number of multinational ﬂrms increases.
Turning to the domestic labor market, we analyse the employment eﬁect
of changes in the two host-country characteristics ` and wM. The eﬁect of
both variables on the proﬂtability of FDI is obvious. Lower values of ` imply
smaller ﬂxed costs of FDI and ` obviously depends upon the host-country
policy. Both the regulatory regime, i.e. the ease with which a foreign plant
can be set up, and the quality of the host-country infrastructure do aﬁect `.
The importance of the host-country wage level for both ﬂxed and variable
c o s t si so b v i o u s .
First, we consider the case of a given total number of ﬂrms. If FDI becomes
more proﬂtable due to a fall in `, the number of multinationals increases (i.e.
h falls), and demand for unskilled labor declines. The relation between ` and
LS is more complicated. The increase in the number of multinationals will
reduce prices, increase aggregate output and will therefore lead to increased
demand for skilled labor. In addition, a greater number of multinational ﬂrms
means that more ﬂrms make the ﬂxed investment. There is a countervailing
20eﬁect, however. The fall in ` implies that existing multinationals must employ
less skilled labor. The eﬁect of ` on aggregate labor demand is unambiguous
if – = ￿ and ‰ = `.13 In this case, production and setting up a plant requires
the same amount of skilled labor as unskilled labor. Lemma 3 demonstrates
the negative impact on employment.
Lemma 3 An increase in FDI due to a fall in ` reduces aggregate employ-
ment.























(n +1 ) 2wS
2ns(wU ¡ wM)2–2 > 0: ⁄ (39)
This result is consistent with empirical ﬂndings by Blomstr˜ om, Fors and
Lipsey (1997) who ﬂnd a negative eﬁect on total domestic employment for
US multinationals allocating labor-intensive production stages to a–liates in
developing countries.
The eﬁect of wM on aggregate employment is less clear. The reason is that
foreign wages aﬁect marginal costs. In addition to the indirect eﬁect via the
induced change in the number of multinational ﬂrms, lower values of wM
imply an output expansion due to the reduction in marginal costs. Both of
these eﬁects yield unambiguously a negative relation between foreign wages
13Note that these assumptions are su–cient, not necessary to derive Lemma 3.
21and demand for skilled labor in the home country. LS increases if wM falls.
The eﬁect on aggregate employment is unclear. While we consider it unlikely
that increased FDI has a positive employment eﬁect in this setting, we cannot
theoretically exclude a positive employment eﬁect.
Turning to the case in which exit and entry are possible, we ﬂrst demonstrate
that the relation between domestic employment and ` is not monotonic in
general. Figure 3 shows that employment may ﬂrst increase as ` falls below
a threshold (` • 34:18) triggering FDI. Eventually employment falls as `
becomes small.14 We have already demonstrated that increasing `,i . e .t h e
ﬂxed skilled labor requirement for FDI, has two eﬁects on employment. It
reduces employment by reducing the number of ﬂrms implying higher prices
and lower output. At the same time labor demand increases as all existing
ﬂrms must now make higher ﬂxed investments. Figure 3 shows that either of
these eﬁects may dominate.






Figure 3: The relation between aggregate employment and `.
Two ﬂnal points with respect to the impact of ` are worth mentioning. First,
the employment eﬁects of FDI may be negative for all values of `.T h i sf o l l o w s
14The parameters used in the example are: wS =1 0 0 ;wU =9 0 ;wM =4 5 ;" =5 ;￿ =
1;‰ M =1 ;–=1 ;‰=1 ;a=2 5 0 ;s=1 0 0 ;·=1 .
22immediately from the employment level in the above example when there
is only domestic production. In that case employment is equal to 11632.5.
Second, a reduction in the cost of doing FDI need not beneﬂt the domestic
labor market as is immediately apparent from Figure 3.
The eﬁect of a reduction in foreign wages on aggregate domestic employment
can be divided into two parts. First, once multinationals are dominant, it
increases total domestic employment because both ﬂxed and marginal costs
of multinational ﬂrms decrease and thus the number of ﬂrms and aggregate
output increase. Second, employment levels under the FDI regime and the
trade regime can be compared. Figure 4 shows that employment may decline
or increase as a consequence of FDI.15 As soon as wM • 73:5t h eF D Ir e g i m e
applies. The employment eﬁect of FDI is only positive if wM is su–ciently
small.






Figure 4: The relation between aggregate employment and the foreign wage wM.
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate that the market structure eﬁects are the driving
forces of labor demand.
15The parameters used in the example are: wS =1 0 0 ;wU =7 5 ;` =1 0 ;" =5 ;￿ =
1;‰ M =1 ;–=1 ;‰=1 ;a=2 2 0 ;s=1 0 0 ;·=1 .





Figure 5: The relation between the number of ﬂrms and the foreign wage wM.





Figure 6: The relation between prices and the foreign wage wM.
Figure 5 shows that the number of ﬂrms may fall drastically due to the
switch to the FDI regime. Then, despite larger demand for skilled labor for
FDI, labor demand declines. Figure 6 shows that prices decline gradually
when wM decreases implying a continuous increase in aggregate output. As
a consequence of declining foreign wages, in the example both the increase
24in aggregate output and in the number of ﬂrms lead eventually to a positive
employment eﬁect compared to the trade regime.
Figure 4 shows that the aggregate employment eﬁects of FDI are ambiguous.
Here, two further remarks are warranted. First, employment need not be
g r e a t e ri nt h eF D Ir e g i m et h a ni ns i t u a t i o nw i t h o u tF D Ie v e ni fwM =0 .
It is easy to ﬂnd examples with a negative employment eﬁect even in this
case. Second, if ‰ = `, the employment eﬁect is negative if wM is close to
the foreign wage which separates the FDI from the trade regime.16 If wM
is equal to the largest wage which guarantees that multinational ﬂrms are
active, the number of multinational ﬂrms is equal to m⁄ according to (27). In
this case, aggregate output coincides under the trade regime (TR)a n dt h e
FDI regime (FR) because the average costs of multinational and national
ﬂrms coincide. Then, a regime switch induces the following changes in skilled



















⁄(‰ + –yh): (41)
h⁄ is determined by (28). If ‰ = ` and since m⁄ <h ⁄, employment for both
types of labor declines.
The above analysis has shown that, contrary to popular thinking, a decline
in foreign wages increases employment if FDI occurs anyway. The reason is
that low foreign wages make the domestic industry more competitive. Our
results are similar to those of Skaksen and S¿rensen (2001). They ﬂnd that the
employment eﬁects will be positive once foreign wages are su–ciently small.
Similar to our approach there exist complementarities between the diﬁerent
production stages in their model. Contrary to their model of a monopolist
facing an isoelastic demand function, the employment eﬁects in our model
16The respective value of wM is calculated like f0 (see (26)).
25are not necessarily positive if foreign wages approach zero. The reason is that
demand is bounded in our model. In our model industry structure, i.e. the
number of ﬂrms, is also aﬁected by the level of foreign wages. Therefore,
our approach provides an additional channel for employment eﬁects. It also
shows how diﬁerent types of labor are aﬁected by changes in foreign wages.
5 Concluding remarks
The consequences of FDI are a hotly debated issue. We have presented a
model which enabled us to address the welfare and labor market eﬁects of
vertical FDI. With one exception, the results depend crucially on the market
entry regime. The exception concerns consumers. They will always gain when
ﬂrms start multinational production and equilibrium prices decline. The ef-
fect on welfare depends upon whether ﬂrms are free to enter and exit, or not.
If the number of ﬂrms is ﬂxed, a switch to multinational production may
lead to welfare losses because business stealing by multinational ﬂrms leads
to rent dissipation. If the emerging industry structure is one of coexistence
among domestic and multinational ﬂrms, welfare is likely to be lower than
under the trade regime where FDI is banned. FDI may improve welfare if it
is not costly and productive.
Results are diﬁerent under free entry and exit. As soon as FDI is optimal for
a single ﬂrm, it is also welfare improving. Free entry and, even more impor-
tant, exit facilitate a rationalizing eﬁect. Firms can then exploit economies of
scale, and this rationalizing eﬁect drives the unambiguously positive welfare
eﬁects of vertical FDI when also the number of active ﬂrms is determined
endogenously.
As regards labor market eﬁects, our results are in line with empirical ﬂndings.
In the case without entry and exit, the demand for unskilled workers is likely
to decline, but increases for skilled workers. Nevertheless, FDI is likely to
reduce aggregate employment in this case. If entry and exit are possible,
26employment eﬁects depend crucially on both the productivity and the costs
of FDI. FDI which is proﬂtable, but does not su–ciently reduce the marginal
cost leads to a decline in aggregate employment. If FDI reduces the marginal
cost su–ciently, aggregate employment will rise. In this case, the reduction
in marginal cost implies a substantial increase in aggregate production which
is su–cient to increase aggregate employment. Note that once FDI occurs, a
decline in foreign wages increases domestic employment. Taken together, we
ﬂnd a striking divergence of the welfare and the labor market eﬁects of FDI
for many parameter sets, especially in the free entry/exit case.
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